One Threatens Destruction, the Other Wants Relations. A Political Scientist Reflects on Divergences in the Rhetoric of the Foreign Ministry and the Security Council

On 18 April, State Secretary of the Security Council Alexander Volfovich suspected (https://news.zerkalo.io/economics/12828.html?tg) the western neighbors of preparing aggression.

He noted that Belarus would not leave this unanswered.

At the same time, earlier the foreign minister had called in a letter (https://news.zerkalo.io/economics/12706.html?tg) on the same European Union countries to abandon the policy of sanctions and restore dialogue.

What do these divergences in the rhetoric of political agencies mean?

Does this indicate some disagreements within the system?

Political scientist Andrei Kazakevich reflects on this topic in his column.

Quite recently, a letter from the Belarusian Foreign Ministry was published proposing the resumption of “dialogue” with European countries.

After that, new threats were already voiced against these countries, and a number of politically motivated repressive actions were carried out inside the country.

Such actions may look contradictory and be explained by a lack of coordination among different agencies or even by a struggle between “Westernizers” and the “Russian world” within the ruling class.

But in essence, there is nothing unusual about such contradictions in contemporary international politics.

It is enough to recall the interaction between the diplomatic agencies of Russia and the United States during the several months before the beginning of the war in Ukraine.

Harsh statements (https://news.zerkalo.io/world/7377.html) alternated with assurances (https://www.state.gov/translations/russian/%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%80%D1%8B%D1%82%D1%8B%D0%B9-%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%84%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B3-%D0%B2%D1%8B%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B3/) of a desire to establish “dialogue,” “direct communication,” and “constructive cooperation.”

Among other recent examples, one can recall the foreign policy and rhetoric of Donald Trump, which were also extremely contradictory and quickly moved from the threat of military intervention to proposals to make a deal.

The alternation of conciliatory and aggressive rhetoric is a widespread technique that allows one to assess the opponent’s (partner’s) readiness for interaction, outline its conditions, and gauge their capacity to make concessions.

In the case of Belarus, one can recall that after the start of the political crisis in 2020, when official rhetoric was already full of stories about a “Western conspiracy,” “fomenting revolution,” and “the clanking of tracks” on the western border, in his address to the Federal President of Germany Alexander Lukashenka could still emphasize (https://president.gov.by/ru/events/pozdravlenie-federalnomu-prezidentu-federativnoy-respubliki-germaniya-franku-valteru-shtaynmayeru) that he “very much counts on the resumption of joint work in various areas during Germany’s presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 2020.”

In general, for the Belarusian authorities and the political communication they have built in recent years, contradictory and substantively vague rhetoric is rather the rule than the exception.

It appears to be constructed not from some rational strategy, but “according to the situation,” proceeding from Lukashenka’s political intuition, experience, and emotions.

In this regard, the proposal of “dialogue” to Europe through diplomatic channels and the “threat of war” in public rhetoric, or the activation of repression, fully fit the practice of recent years.

But like any approach, shifts in rhetoric have their limits.

First, people gradually become accustomed to it and stop taking it fully seriously.

Over the past couple of years, Alexander Lukashenka has already accustomed foreign politicians to the fact that his speeches cannot be a source of reliable information or a declaration of real intentions.

The practical role of such speeches is not to inform, but to demonstrate optimism and resolve through promises and threats, most of which are never fulfilled, and many of which simply cannot be fulfilled.

There have also been plenty of sheer fantasies in such statements, such as the intercepted conversation of “Nick and Mike,” the assertion that Ukraine was preparing a strike against Belarus, and that events in Bucha were staged by British intelligence.

It is unlikely that any foreign politician now takes Alexander Lukashenka’s rhetoric seriously, or at least literally.

The focus of attention has shifted to the analysis of practical actions, while the significance of words, promises, and assurances has been extremely devalued.

Second, shifts in rhetoric are designed to exert psychological influence on the opponent (partner) and provoke some reaction: fear, concern, or readiness for cooperation.

Here, the problem, and perhaps the tragedy for the Belarusian authorities, is not even that such messages often produce the opposite reaction.

As in the case of the migration crisis, threats from official Minsk caused not fear and confusion in Vilnius and Warsaw, but consolidation and even counteroffensive actions.

The real problem is that, under current conditions, the authorities’ rhetoric has practically stopped provoking any reaction outside the country at all.

Official Minsk is increasingly perceived less as an actor capable of influencing the situation in the region and more as one losing control inside the country, at least in matters of security.

Indicative in this respect is the return of many politicians and experts, especially in the United States, to viewing Belarus as an extension of Russia and the spread of the concept of “occupation.”

It seems that rhetoric, whether aggressive or conciliatory, has been almost completely lost by the Belarusian authorities as an instrument of influence in foreign policy.

This is a component of the process of destruction of foreign policy that began in August 2020.

Trust in the speeches and statements of Belarusian officials is at an extremely low level, and the statements themselves cannot be a source of reliable information about either facts or intentions.

The voice of the authorities is now increasingly perceived as something not worthy of attention.

It is indeed possible to attract attention somehow, but not by using rhetoric.

Only practical actions that are important and visible to other countries can change something.

And given the increased threshold of sensitivity under conditions of war in Ukraine, they must be significant.

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