“Minsk Is Not Receiving Unequivocal Support from Moscow”

Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau stated on 23 November that the republic was ready to discuss the migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border with Russia.

Poland is not refusing technical contacts with Belarusian officials, but according to Mr. Rau, the future of relations between the two countries can be discussed only with the Belarusian opposition.

Doctor of political science and director of the Political Sphere Institute Andrei Kazakevich comments on the situation.
— Will this message from Warsaw lead to any concrete results?

Or, until Lukashenka forces the West to conduct dialogue with him directly, will the crisis at the border keep smoldering and flaring up again? Operation “Migration”: Has Lukashenka Got What He Wanted? (https://www.rosbalt.ru/world/2021/11/19/1931748.html)
— This is a difficult question.

For now, it is only a statement.

It is designed to elicit a reaction in Minsk.

This position of the Polish authorities may change.

In this way, they are simply showing that if Minsk worsens the situation, they will try to reach an agreement with Moscow, which has real mechanisms for influencing Lukashenka.

In addition, they will discuss the future of Belarus only with the opposition, ignoring Alexander Grigorievich.

If Poland begins to act this way, then in a year, perhaps, the entire European Union will follow its path.

It cannot be ruled out that Russia may begin playing by these rules.

Then Lukashenka’s era will come to an end.
— Do you not think that a triangle of contradictions is forming: Minsk—Moscow—Brussels, in which all sides in one way or another oppose each other?

Putin, for example, called on Lukashenka to begin dialogue with the opposition.

From Minsk, we heard a threat to shut off the transit of Russian gas through Belarus to Europe.

Even between the two parts of the Union State, some kind of disunity is now emerging.
— Yes.

I agree with that.

Against the backdrop of Europe’s consolidation on the Belarus issue, Minsk is not receiving unequivocal support from Moscow.

There is assistance, but over the past year we have also repeatedly seen Russian leadership verbally indicate that it may play a more complex game.

A game in which there will be no Lukashenka, or in which the opposition will be present.

Under certain conditions, Moscow may conduct dialogue on the Belarus issue with Brussels.

Here the Kremlin faces quite a difficult task.

Unconditionally supporting Lukashenka is a risky undertaking, since the country’s economic prospects are unclear.

The prospects for resolving the political crisis are unclear, because domestic political tension remains high.

Repression has reached its peak level for the entire history of Lukashenka’s rule.

It exceeds several times over the scale we have seen over the past 25 years.

A significant part of society is negatively disposed toward the current authorities.

Apparently, this is a majority or close to a majority. “If Lukashenka Could ‘Push Europe Through,’ It Would Send a Message to All Autocrats” (https://www.rosbalt.ru/world/2021/11/18/1931549.html)
In such a situation, of course, betting on Lukashenka alone is too risky.

Moreover, everyone knows that he is an excessively self-willed autocrat.

This means that at any moment he may change his line of behavior and, for example, start threatening to shut down the gas pipeline.

Therefore, I think that in the future, strategically, Russia will rather seek to keep Belarus in its orbit of influence through integration in specific areas and through strengthened military cooperation.

In the longer term, perhaps, through contacts with the Belarusian opposition, so that it can guarantee itself a positive outcome in any case, whether Lukashenka remains in power or not.

Although it is still too early to speak of direct confrontation.

This is a fairly natural position for the Russian leadership: to demonstrate some divergence while providing general support.
— What would Lukashenka have to do for Moscow to decide to create conditions for his exit from the political stage?
— It is very difficult to single out one event.

Lukashenka could withdraw from the CSTO, shut off gas, organize a blockade of the Russian-Belarusian border, or arrest property or an important Russian citizen.

These are things that are difficult to predict, and they are unlikely.

Lukashenka understands that in the current situation Russia is his only support.

It is practically impossible for him to establish good relations with the West.

A cumulative effect may lead Russia to a decision to remove Lukashenka.

Since the beginning of the political crisis, Moscow has given him carte blanche to stabilize the situation.

We can see that Alexander Grigorievich is not coping with this task.

The situation of instability persists.

This is a powder keg, and if something “explodes,” it may turn against Russia.

On the other hand, the Belarusian authorities are behaving in a completely unpredictable way on issues of regional security.

This includes the migration crisis and relations with Ukraine.

To some extent, this benefits the Russian leadership, but again everything depends on the degree of unpredictability. The Show on the Polish Border Has Gone from Absurd to Savage (https://www.rosbalt.ru/blogs/2021/11/16/1931267.html)
The sum total of all these factors may lead the Kremlin to say: that’s it, we need to launch a transition on our terms.

I do not think that this threshold has already been crossed, but it may well happen, because the behavior of the Belarusian authorities is not fully rational.