How the three previous referendums affected the real lives of Belarusians

Belsat spoke about the significance of each of the three referendums with Andrei Kazakevich , Doctor of Political Science and Director of the Political Sphere Institute.

What the 1995 referendum changed

At first glance, Lukashenko was asking for a relatively modest power: merely the right to dissolve parliament in cases of gross or systematic violations of the Constitution.

“This referendum allowed Aliaksandr Lukashenko to demonstrate that the majority was on his side,” Kazakevich explains. “The president’s moral and political advantage over parliament became obvious. At least over the Supreme Soviet of the 12th convocation: at the end of 1995 a new parliament was elected, and the confrontation continued.”

At the same time, the national coat of arms and flag were replaced with modified Soviet symbols, and Russian was granted the status of a state language alongside Belarusian. Belarusians were also asked whether they supported Lukashenko’s actions toward the economic integration of Belarus and Russia. The “yes” option won.

But the main result for Lukashenko, Kazakevich says, was that he was able to consolidate a majority, and that majority supported his agenda. This allowed him to feel much more confident in his further confrontation with parliament.

“The referendum gave a free hand to roll back Belarusization,” the political scientist notes. “Most likely, it would have slowed down under Lukashenko’s rule anyway. But in this way it became possible to curtail it immediately: to begin persecuting opponents for using national symbols and to ‘cancel’ or marginalize the use of the Belarusian language. It was always possible to appeal to the idea that people had expressed their will and did not like these symbols or this language. Formally, the white-red-white flag and the Pahonia were, of course, never banned, but from that time on people began to be actively punished for using so-called unregistered symbols.”

There was also a foreign-policy result, he adds: Lukashenko showed the outside world that he was a pro-Russian politician not only in words, but was genuinely ready to stop Belarusization and the course toward sovereignty and to begin deepening integration with Russia.

What the 1996 referendum changed

Andrei Kazakevich calls this referendum “a key moment in the consolidation of authoritarian power.” Despite numerous recorded violations of electoral law, the version of constitutional amendments proposed by Lukashenko prevailed. These amendments gave him virtually unlimited executive and legislative powers.

“Before this referendum, parliament was still an independent source of power,” he recalls. “The deputies had been elected not long before, they also had a popular mandate, and the election results were not disputed. Therefore, the deputies felt rather confident and even initiated an impeachment procedure against Lukashenko. Parliament had real power because it adopted laws that Lukashenko and the entire state apparatus were forced to take into account.”

The 1996 amendments did not merely violate the principle of separation of powers. They allowed Lukashenko to rebuild all political institutions: to appoint a new government on his own, dissolve the Supreme Soviet and effectively appoint the House of Representatives by selecting 110 loyal deputies.

Under the new Constitution, the president gained the ability to determine the composition of the entire executive branch. The prime minister was only formally approved by the House of Representatives, after the appointment had already been made. The president also appointed judges and the chair of the Supreme Court, formally with approval by the Council of the Republic, which he himself had appointed. He appointed half of the judges and the chair of the Constitutional Court; formally, only half, while the other half was appointed by the Council of the Republic.

Finally, the 1996 Constitution allowed the president to issue decrees and edicts that had greater legal force than laws. In effect, Lukashenko could overturn any law, and he actively used this power.

“This made it possible to calmly consolidate power before the 2001 elections and gradually destroy or severely weaken alternative political centers and forces in Belarus,” Kazakevich concludes.

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