How Regimes in Russia and Belarus That Do Not Want to Leave Will Fall: A Political Scientist’s Forecast

How may the Ukrainian war end for Russia and Belarus?

How can changes actually take place in Russia and Belarus?

Is it already possible today to imagine the mechanism of these changes?

Andrei Kazakevich, director of the Political Sphere Institute and Doctor of Political Science, discusses this and other issues in an interview with Radio Liberty (https://www.svaboda.org/a/31860110.html).
“Russia is facing a revolution from above”
— Many people are now predicting the imminent fall of Putin’s regime in Russia as a result of an unsuccessful war in Ukraine.

But other analysts do not see a simple link between defeat in Ukraine and Putin’s departure.

Which category do you place yourself in?
— Apparently, neither the first nor the second.

I do not think that such things can be predicted.

The only thing that can be said with certainty is that a military defeat in Ukraine will create substantial challenges and risks for Putin’s authority and for the political system that has now taken shape in Russia.

The Kremlin’s response to these challenges may vary: it may cope with them, or they may lead to serious changes.
— When I think about potential changes in Russia, I catch myself thinking that I cannot imagine the real process or the real mechanism of these changes.

Many speak of a coup.

Others, mostly democratic Russian activists abroad, speak of some kind of refounding of Russia.

But in reality, given the complexity and scale of this country, all the options look rather doubtful.

In your opinion, what could be the mechanism for a change of power in Russia: a revolt, a revolution from above, a coup, economic collapse, or something else?
— There are not that many mechanisms.

You have listed most of them.

Take a revolt.

It cannot be ruled out; it happens spontaneously when certain problems in the country, for example economic ones, come to the surface.

But at the moment we do not see a social base for such a revolt.

We also do not see the authorities in Russia being delegitimised in a way that would make such a revolt possible, or people there not trusting the leadership.

On the contrary, sociological surveys show that the authorities’ ratings are at their maximum.

But if society grows tired and the situation drags on, loyalty will also decline.

At the present moment, however, it is not possible to speak of a revolt.

A coup is also an unpredictable phenomenon and a very rare one in the modern world.

If we look at the contemporary political map of the world, this mechanism of changing power works, in some form, only in Africa.

But states there are completely different and much weaker than in other regions of the planet.

If we imagine that a coup takes place in Russia and that part of the political elite assumes responsibility for replacing Putin, this option looks unlikely, especially in a situation where Putin remains very popular.

Perhaps after some time, if his rating falls, say, to 20 percent and distrust exceeds 50 percent, such a group may appear.

But for now there are no political grounds for this.

Therefore, what remains is a revolution from above.

This is the basic scenario.

In Russia it has also already been implemented once: this was perestroika in the USSR.

There have been such cases in other countries as well, for example in Iran, when it opened up in the 1990s and changes took place from above.

One can also mention Burma, where since the late 1980s there were effectively no elections, but in 2008, in order to have sanctions lifted and ease foreign-policy isolation, the military regime held elections and began liberalisation, which, as we know, was rolled back in early 2021.

There are many such examples, so this scenario is quite probable.

But again, for it to happen there must be a certain fatigue.

It never happens when both the country and the elites are full of adrenaline, when they believe that something can be resolved on the battlefield and while resources are still sufficient.

But when fatigue begins to appear, when it becomes clear that Russia cannot restore an empire through war, that the situation is a dead end and must be changed, that relations with the West must be restored, and therefore that some kind of liberalisation is needed, then something may change.

It may be recalled that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 helped many authoritarian leaders establish more or less normal relations with the West.

For example, Gaddafi.

Or the situation in Ukraine in 2014 allowed Lukashenka to begin liberalisation and intensify relations with the West.

Perhaps in Russia some event will one day help the elite begin such a process without major losses.

But I repeat once again.

For this to happen, fatigue is needed, first, and second, an understanding of failure, an understanding that an empire cannot be built in this way.
– And there is also the economy.

How resilient is the Russian economy in the face of international sanctions?
— Yes, the economy too.

But I include it in the fatigue factor.

I do not believe that economic collapse is possible; historically, such phenomena are very rare, and they are especially rare when the authorities expect them, while Russia does expect them and is thinking through its options.

I think the Russian economy will develop according to the Iranian scenario: limited growth, a large number of social problems, reduced opportunities, and deteriorating conditions for business, but not a sharp, abrupt decline.

But stagnation and emigration will be important factors of fatigue from problems.

And, probably, an important factor that will lead Russian elites to understand that the burden of empire is too heavy for contemporary Russia, that it must somehow be redistributed and that some ambitions must be abandoned.
“Sanctions against Belarus are already working very strongly”
— How would you assess the effect of international sanctions imposed on the regime in Minsk?

Earlier, even a month or a month and a half ago, some analysts spoke rather optimistically about the state of the Belarusian economy despite sanctions.

But in recent days even they have begun speaking of a “perfect storm” gradually engulfing the country’s economy.

Are sanctions working, and when will they work?
— They are already working.

The economic losses are visible.

It is enough to look at what share of Belarusian exports is falling away.

It is not 5 or 10 percent, but 20 percent or more.

Some of this will be redirected to other markets, some will reach its former consumers by roundabout routes, but in any case these are very substantial losses.

There are losses in other spheres besides exports as well.

For example, we know that many companies are leaving Belarus; some are doing so publicly, some are not.

The IT sector is in a difficult situation; many companies can no longer work in Belarus, despite the fact that it is economically advantageous.

There are many reasons for this situation.

Consumers do not want products to be made in an unfree country or in an aggressor country; foreign companies prohibit the use of their software on the territory of Belarus, and so on.

The same applies to technologies.

Talk of import substitution can be disregarded.

In 2021, Belarus’s spending on science and development was in the range of 300–400 million dollars.

In the European Union it is around 300 billion.

Even in Russia this figure is around 14 billion dollars.

And then there are the United States and Japan.

So there is nothing to compare here.

We cannot compete; we can only steal.

So if sanctions remain in place, there cannot be two options.

First there will be a decline in GDP, crises in individual sectors, emigration, and, as a result, stagnation.

I would recall that during the decade before 2020, average economic growth in Belarus was around 1 percent per year, and this was despite the fact that relations with Russia were fairly good and relations with Europe and the United States were fairly good.

Some reforms were also carried out that allowed private business and the IT sector to develop.

Under conditions of sanctions and a shrinking market, even such growth is unrealistic.
“Belarus will not become North Korea”
— Let us imagine the departure of Putin’s regime in Russia.

Many say that the regime in Minsk will follow very soon after it.

But one can also hear the view that there is no direct link here: that North Korea, for example, has existed for many decades as a prison-camp country, terrorising its own people, and the regime there somehow survives.

Could this happen to Belarus?
— Still, North Korea has a very strong and wealthy sponsor in the form of China.

Belarus would be in a very difficult situation, because on all sides there would be unfriendly countries with claims against Lukashenka.

After the war, Ukraine will also join them, since it considers him a co-aggressor.

Therefore I think that, in such a case, changes would be very rapid, because Russia is the main sponsor of the Belarusian economic and political model, and the Minsk regime’s economic dependence on Russia is very high and may grow even further as a result of the current crisis.