How Regimes in Russia and Belarus That Do Not Want to Leave May Fall. A Political Scientist’s Forecast

How might the Ukrainian war end for Russia and Belarus?

How can real changes take place in Russia and Belarus?

Can we already imagine the mechanism of these changes today?

Andrei Kazakevich, director of the Political Sphere Institute and Doctor of Political Science, reflects on these and other questions.

Briefly
A military defeat in Ukraine will create significant challenges and risks for Putin’s power and for the political system that has now taken shape in Russia.

Power in Russia will be changed neither by a coup nor by a riot.

The most likely scenario of change in that country is a revolution from above.

When it becomes clear that, because of the war, Russia cannot restore the empire, that the situation is a dead end and must be changed, and that relations with the West must be rebuilt, then something may change.

An economic collapse in Russia should not be expected.

If sanctions against the Belarusian economy remain in place, there will first be a decline in GDP, a crisis in individual sectors, emigration and, as a result, stagnation.

Belarus cannot turn into North Korea, which exists with China’s support.

Without Russia’s support, the regime in Minsk will disappear very quickly.

The most appropriate scenario of change in Belarus is negotiations, an agreement and new elections.
“Russia faces a revolution from above”
— Many people are now predicting the imminent fall of Putin’s regime in Russia as a result of the unsuccessful war in Ukraine.

But other analysts do not see a direct link between defeat in Ukraine and Putin’s departure.

Which category do you place yourself in?
— Probably neither the first nor the second.

I do not think such things can be predicted.

The only thing that can be said with certainty is that a military defeat in Ukraine will create significant challenges and risks for Putin’s power and for the political system that has now taken shape in Russia.

The Kremlin’s reaction to these challenges may vary: it may cope with them, or they may lead to serious changes.
— When I think about potential changes in Russia, I catch myself thinking that I cannot imagine the real process or mechanism of these changes.

Many people speak about a coup.

Others, mostly democratic Russian activists abroad, speak about some kind of refounding of Russia.

But in reality, given the complexity and scale of this country, all the options look somewhat doubtful.

In your opinion, what could be the mechanism of a change of power in Russia: a riot, a revolution from above, a coup, economic collapse, or something else?
— There are not many mechanisms.

You have listed most of them.

Let us say, a riot.

It is impossible to rule it out; it happens spontaneously when certain problems in the country, for example economic ones, come to the surface.

But now we do not see a social base for such a riot.

Nor do we see that power in Russia has been delegitimized for such a riot, that people there do not trust the leadership.

On the contrary, sociological surveys show that the authorities’ ratings are at their maximum.

But if society grows tired and the situation drags on, then loyalty will also decline.

At the present moment, however, there is no reason to speak about a riot.

A coup is also an unpredictable phenomenon and a very rare one in the modern world.

If we look at today’s political map of the world, this mechanism of changing power works in some way only in Africa.

But states there are entirely different and much weaker than in other regions of the planet.

If we imagine that a coup takes place in Russia and part of the political elite assumes responsibility for replacing Putin, this option looks unlikely, especially in a situation in which Putin remains very popular.

Perhaps after some time, if his rating falls, say, to 20 percent and distrust exceeds 50, such a group may emerge.

But for now there are no political grounds for this.

Therefore, what remains is a revolution from above.

This is the basic scenario.

In Russia, it has also already been implemented once: perestroika in the USSR.

It has happened in other countries as well, for example in Iran, when it opened up in the 1990s and changes from above took place.

One can also recall Burma, where there had effectively been no elections since the late 1980s, but in 2008, in order to lift sanctions and ease foreign-policy isolation, the military regime held elections and began liberalization, which, as we know, was rolled back in early 2021.

There are many such examples, so this scenario is quite likely.

But, again, a certain fatigue is required for it.

This never happens when both the country and the elites are full of adrenaline, when they believe that something can still be resolved on the battlefield and while resources remain sufficient.

But when fatigue begins to appear, when it becomes clear that Russia cannot restore the empire through war, and that the situation is a dead end and must be changed, that relations with the West must be rebuilt, and therefore some liberalization is needed, then something may change.

It can be recalled that the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 helped many authoritarian leaders establish more or less normal relations with the West.

For example, Qaddafi.

Or the situation in Ukraine in 2014 allowed Lukashenka to begin liberalization and activate relations with the West.

Perhaps in Russia some event will one day help the elite begin such a process without major losses.

But I will repeat once more.

For this to happen, first, fatigue is needed, and second, an understanding of failure, an understanding that an empire cannot be built in this way.
— And there is also the economy.

How resilient is the Russian economy to international sanctions?
— Yes, the economy as well.

But I include it in the fatigue factor.

I do not believe an economic collapse is possible; in history, such phenomena are very rare, and they are especially rare when the authorities expect them, and Russia expects them and is thinking through options.

I think the Russian economy will develop according to the Iranian scenario: limited growth, a large number of social problems, shrinking opportunities and worsening conditions for business, but not a sudden, sharp decline.

But stagnation and emigration will be important factors in fatigue with the problems.

And probably an important factor that will bring Russian elites to the understanding that the burden of empire is too heavy for contemporary Russia, that it must somehow be redistributed and that part of the ambitions must be abandoned.
“Sanctions against Belarus are already working very strongly”
— How would you assess the effect of international sanctions imposed on the regime in Minsk?

Earlier, a month or a month and a half ago, some analysts spoke rather optimistically about the state of Belarus’s economy despite the sanctions.

But in recent days even they have begun speaking about a “perfect storm” that is gradually covering the country’s economy.

Are sanctions working, and when will they work?
— They are already working.

The economic losses are visible.

It is enough to look at what share of Belarusian exports is falling away.

This is not 5 or 10 percent; it is 20 percent and more.

Something will be redirected to other markets, something will reach the previous consumer through roundabout routes, but in any case these are very significant losses.

There are losses in other areas besides exports as well.

For example, we know that many companies are leaving Belarus: some do this publicly, others do not.

The situation with the IT sector is complicated; many companies can no longer operate in Belarus, despite the fact that from an economic point of view it is profitable.

There are many reasons for this situation.

Consumers do not want products to be made in an unfree country or an aggressor country; foreign companies prohibit the use of their software on the territory of Belarus, and so on.

The same applies to technologies.

Talk about import substitution can be disregarded.

In 2021, Belarus’s spending on science and development was around 300–400 million dollars.

In the European Union it is about 300 billion.

Even in Russia this figure is about 14 billion dollars.

And there are also the United States and Japan.

So there is nothing to compare here.

We cannot compete; we can only steal.

So if sanctions remain, there cannot be two options.

First there will be a decline in GDP, a crisis in individual sectors, emigration and, as a result, stagnation.

I will recall that during the decade before 2020, average economic growth in Belarus was around 1% per year, and this despite decent relations with Russia and decent relations with Europe and the United States.

Some reforms were also carried out, which allowed private business and the IT sector to develop.

Under sanctions and a shrinking market, even such growth is unrealistic.
“Belarus will not become the DPRK”
— Let us imagine the departure of Putin’s regime in Russia.

Many people say that very soon the regime in Minsk will follow.

But one can also hear opinions that there is no direct link here: North Korea, they say, has existed for many decades as a prison-camp country, terrorizing its people, and somehow the regime there holds on.

Could the same happen to Belarus?
— Still, North Korea has a very strong and wealthy sponsor in the form of China.

Belarus will find itself in a very difficult situation, because it will be surrounded on all sides by unfriendly countries that have accounts to settle with Lukashenka.

After the war, Ukraine will also join them, since it considers him a co-aggressor.

Therefore, I think that in such a case changes will be very rapid, because Russia is the main sponsor of the Belarusian economic and political model, and the economic dependence of the Minsk regime on Russia is very high and may grow even further as a result of the current crisis.

But political dependence is also very high now.

Even if Russia simply stops supporting Belarus in the foreign-policy arena and in the information space, things will become very bad.

Imagine that Russian media begin saying that Lukashenka is a bad president, begin recalling his violence against people, and his support will very quickly begin to fall apart.

I think that even within the security sphere, changes will take place once Russia’s support is lost.

Because if you look at intercepted conversations from 2020 and various interviews with people from that environment, a certain line runs through them: if anything happens, Russia will help, send troops, and so on.

And if something goes wrong, we will be able to go there and continue living there.

But if these channels disappear, people will quickly begin to think that something serious must be changed.
“The most likely scenario of change in Belarus is new elections”
— And, accordingly, the question of a likely mechanism of change in Belarus.

How can it happen?

There is Lukashenka’s power, which does not want to leave, says that it was legally elected, that it has the support of the majority of the people, and so on.

Where can it go, and how?
— Neither a riot nor a general strike removes power.

It is necessary for some people to come into the office and for those who are there to leave.

Or to be made to leave.

There are two options here.

First, violence, when someone comes and throws the predecessors out of the office.

The second is negotiations and an agreement that power changes.

It seems to me that the second option is more suitable for Belarus, because I do not see possibilities for a forceful or armed confrontation.

For that, appropriate structures would have to exist.

Some structures are now being created, primarily in Ukraine.

But the question of how much they will feel the situation inside the country remains open.

So one can consider a scenario in which, as a result of a crisis, when Russia stops providing political and economic support, Lukashenka will be forced to hold elections.

This is what the United States and the European Union are demanding.

Pinochet once did this when he was forced to begin democratization, as did many other Latin American dictators.

And before these elections, some kind of agreement must be reached.

For example, a Belarus–European Union agreement, in which a certain configuration of changes is set out.

Elections take place more or less democratically, and their results are recognized.

At the same time, the elections may not even be presidential; they may be parliamentary.

For example, parliamentary elections are planned in Belarus in 2024.

Source (https://www.svaboda.org/a/31860110.html)