Interview with Political Sphere researcher Aliaksei Lastouski

Aliaksei Lastouski: It is impossible for Belarusians to implement a radical national project, but the tendency toward nationalization is inevitable.

Andrei Kazakevich talks with sociologist Aliaksei Lastouski.
https://palityka.org/?attachment_id=7013— The phrase “historical narrative” is quite often encountered in contemporary scholarly debates. What is the meaning of this concept?
— Within traditional approaches, history was regarded as a science that should provide objective knowledge about the past, “as it actually was,” but the spread of the concept of “historical narrative” signals that we now look differently at the purpose of history.

Today, our turn to the past appears as a search for answers for the present, one determined above all by political and cultural relevance.

And then history is no longer simply knowledge, but a story, a “tale” about the past from the standpoint of certain significant social and political subjects, such as the nation-state or counter-elites, a story that has its own particular meaning, internal logic, and dramatic plot.

History is thus transformed into a historical narrative.
— What is the significance of historical narrative in contemporary society?

Is it greater or lesser?

Can one say that its peak influence fell during the “age of nationalism,” and that now we are observing a gradual decline?
— For millennia, virtually all political regimes appealed to heritage, to ancient and glorious origins, and in this way built their legitimacy.

But in the nineteenth century, major changes occurred in the understanding of the past, which can be described as the formation of a “national narrative.”

At that time, history lost its connection with dynastic rule and acquired special significance for national interests; it became a foundation for the creation of modern nations.

Memory of common ancestors, their feats and achievements, traditions of ancient statehood and struggles for freedom was gradually restored or created anew, and without this it is impossible to imagine the creation of nation-states in Europe.

And this foundation cannot be removed from the present.
— If history cannot be abandoned, if it is an obligatory element of any society, then the question arises: does the national historical narrative change?
— For states that built their political institutions in the nineteenth century, a calm stage has now arrived: the national narrative is fixed, woven into the fabric of culture and everyday life.

Academic criticism can be allowed calmly, and a skeptical attitude toward “national myths” can be developed at the level of scholarly communities.

But when we speak about the states of Central and Eastern Europe, then for various reasons there was no uninterrupted state tradition here in the twentieth century.

The national narrative was excluded from the logic of independent development because of external interventions, and this gives rise among the region’s “small nations” to a sense of threat to their existence.
— Has the role of historical narrative in society declined over the past 100—150 years?

It can be criticized and treated skeptically, but does this mean that its role is becoming smaller?
— It seems to me that there is no decline in the significance of history.

Travelling through Western Europe, I see that history and its symbolic dimension are very important for these societies; in popular culture and in the education system, the positions of the national narrative remain largely unshaken.

In the academic sphere, indeed, more critical views prevail, but this has little impact on the level of mass consciousness.

In Eastern Europe, however, there is no such harmony in the separation of spheres: disputes and conflicts unfold at all levels.
— Does this mean that one can distinguish a separate “Eastern European” and “Western European” culture and politics of memory, as the Russian historian Alexei Miller does in an interview (http://nn.by/?c=ar&i=169789)?
— There is certainly a difference between Western and Eastern Europe.

Attitudes toward the communist regime and toward the Holocaust differ, but it seems to me that Europe should be considered as a single space, and then another typology becomes more suitable: we either regard ourselves as heroes or as victims.

In the nineteenth century, it was important to present oneself as a hero, to show the achievements of one’s ancestors; this mobilized people for political action.

After the Second World War, the mode of perceiving the past changed: victims, not heroes, came to occupy the privileged place.

The classic example is the Holocaust.

As a result, it is now more advantageous to be victims, especially for Europe’s small states, those “wronged” by totalitarian empires.
— So what is the model of narrative in contemporary Western Europe, heroes or victims?

How do, for example, contemporary Germans construct their narratives?
— Heroic and victim narratives function as poles; we can rarely find them in pure form.

And in Western Europe, the positions of heroism remain quite strong in popular culture and school education.

For example, commemorations of the anniversary of the First World War contain much of the corresponding pathos.

But above all Germany became the driving force behind a revision of the heroic understanding of its own history.

Naturally, it is difficult to feel oneself a nation of criminals, but it is possible to sympathize with the victims, those who suffered from Nazi crimes, to feel their pain, and to concentrate one’s account of the past on that.
— And if we take individual countries of Eastern Europe?

Can one say that there are fundamental differences in historical narratives, for example between the Ukrainian and Belarusian, or the Polish and Russian ones?
— Russia stands out first of all, because the sense of victimhood is much weaker there; Russian culture is not characterized by compassion, neither toward itself nor toward others.

This is especially visible in the example of the tragedy of peoples included in Russia’s sphere of interests: for the Russian optic, their suffering is insignificant.

If we speak about Belarus and Ukraine, then in both cases the heroic and victim narratives are combined according to a fairly similar model, only different episodes are used.

For Belarusians, the main heroic plot is connected with the Great Patriotic War, and the narrative of victimhood is supported from the same source.

The dominant version of the past in Ukraine also combines the motif of victimhood, the Holodomor, and heroism, armed anti-communist resistance.

But for our neighbors, the problem of the unity of historical narrative and the unity of ideas about the national past is strongly felt.

There were attempts at synthesis under Kuchma, but they did not bear fruit; Yanukovych later tried to do something similar, with the same result.

If we speak about the current situation, then supporters of an anti-communist version of history, with sympathies for the national liberation movement and the OUN-UPA, are setting the tone.

These people shape the policy of the Institute of National Memory, influence legislation and educational programs, but true unity at the mass level is still very far away.
— Can memory policy in our region be characterized as flawed or dangerous?
— It should be emphasized that in any country history is used for political purposes; this in itself is not a pathology.

Does the interpretation of history influence the growth of radicalism and the spread of conflicts?

It seems to me that we exaggerate the role of history in this respect.

For example, the rise of radical nationalism in Poland and the Baltic states is not so much the result of a targeted historical policy as of changes in the international situation, of a sense of threat from Russia.

It is precisely this that stimulates the growth of such feelings.
— And how should one approach and assess trends in the sphere of memory policy?
— One must understand that we do not have a single trend.

At least two processes overlap.

First, there is “Europeanization,” when values and approaches characteristic of Western Europe spread eastward.

The inclusion of Eastern European countries into a pan-European space takes place not only at the level of institutions, but also at the level of values.

This can be observed, for example, in attitudes toward the Holocaust.

Many norms of Western political correctness have already taken root in Eastern Europe.

Another matter is that such tendencies collide with the experience of one’s own traumas and grievances, with a desire to restore one’s dignity, sometimes by exaggerated means.

Such manifestations are noticeable and should be known about, but they should not be hypertrophied or identified as the dominant trend.

It is more likely that the Europeanization of historical policy will intensify, although the international situation remains an important factor.
— And what about countries that do not want or cannot integrate into the European Union?

Russia and Belarus?
— The cases of Russia and Belarus are very different, because these states face different tasks.

In Belarus, statehood itself and national identity are often called into question; this rather stimulates strategies of survival and camouflage.

When policy is defined by reliance on an alliance with Russia, history is tasked simultaneously with marking independence and satisfying Russia’s political ambitions.

True, such a strategy is designed for the short term and does not allow for the creation of a stable foundation for identity and historical memory, which in Belarus have fragile and soft forms.

For Russia, the situation is entirely different.

In the 1990s, certain liberal standards spread, although not always successfully.

Then there was a reaction connected with Vladimir Putin’s rise to power.

For Russia, the main goal in the last decade has been the construction of a “strong state,” the restoration of its own pride and greatness, and this led to a reformulation of history.

In such a situation, liberal approaches are rejected as destructive, as attempts to destroy the glorious past necessary for a “great state.”

Liberal circles remain in Russia, but they are becoming more and more marginalized.
— And what role in these processes is played by the idea and practice of the “Russian world”?
— This idea has a long history and was created above all within the milieu of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church, to designate its own sphere of influence.

After the unfolding of events in Ukraine, the idea of the “Russian world” began to correlate with Russian foreign policy.

Russia began to claim more actively the status of a great power, to return “lost lands,” while the idea of the “Russian world” serves to justify such penetration.

The condition of the Russian minority and the Russian language is a powerful lever of pressure.
— And what role does history play in the unfolding of the “Russian world”?

Is history significant here at all?
— History is an important component here.

We see the manipulation of memory of the Great Patriotic War; this theme is consciously used by the Russian authorities to intervene in the cultural and political processes of neighboring countries.

One can recall the role played by the St George ribbon.

At first, it was an element of “micropolitics,” intended to involve ordinary people in practices of memory, but in the last couple of years the St George ribbon has become an obvious symbol of the spread of the Russian vision of history, strongly linked to the idea and practice of the “Russian world.”

The result is a nervous reaction to these ribbons in countries neighboring Russia.

Even in Belarus, which is Russia’s closest ally in honoring the Victory, the signals are ambiguous.

At the Victory Parade on 9 May 2015 in Moscow, Belarusian military units were effectively the only ones that did not wear St George ribbons.

In addition, recommendations from state bodies are being heard not to use St George ribbons in commemorating Victory Day.

Thus, even in Belarus, attitudes toward this symbol are closely connected with the aggressive image of the “Russian world,” which does not evoke much enthusiasm among the Belarusian authorities.
— And what should be done with the idea and practice of the “Russian world,” in your opinion?
— Belarus is a borderland country, a space where different traditions, languages, and cultures coexist.

And this does not at all correspond to the ideal of unity and exclusivity promoted through the idea of the “Russian world.”

Cultural and political impulses from Russia will inevitably continue to come; Belarusians will have to deal with this in any case.

In such a situation, it is impossible to implement a radical national project that would, for example, entail the complete exclusion of the Russian language from the public sphere.

Therefore, a long-term strategy is needed, one that would minimize destructive influences and harmonize the Belarusian space.

For example, the Russian language and culture can become one of the many elements of Belarusian identity, complex, rich, and saturated.
— And how is the understanding of the past changing in Belarus?
— In my studies of the image of the past in public consciousness, I have noted that there is a tendency toward the nationalization of historical memory.

But this nationalization is slow and gradual.

Already now
a generation is entering active professional and political life that studied from textbooks of the Republic of Belarus, not the BSSR.

The national version of history clearly dominates over “West-Russian” constructions, both in the number of authors and in the number of supporters.

In Belarus, naturally, the country’s president has considerable influence on cultural and political processes, and his pro-Russian and pro-Soviet inclinations undoubtedly affected historical policy.

But at the same time some important processes are moving from below, and it is difficult to cancel them through the personal sympathies of the head of state.

Slow Belarusization is taking place above all where it does not provoke conflicts.

For example, the actualization of the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania does not lead to direct confrontation with the historical narrative of the Russian state.

Some “patriots” raised a fuss over the unveiling of a monument to Algirdas, presenting it as an anti-Russian action, but one can recall that in Novgorod the Great in 1862 the monument “Millennium of Russia” was erected, and among the figures who built the Russian state it includes Algirdas, as well as Gediminas and Vytautas.
— How can one forecast the development of the situation?

Will this tendency toward nationalization continue?
— If an independent state exists, then this tendency will inevitably remain.

It is more difficult to forecast Russia’s behavior in the future.

Will it strive for more aggressive penetration into the Belarusian cultural and political space?

For a long time, Belarus was left to itself, because it was assumed that there was already a pro-Russian leadership here, and there was no need to invest additional resources or conduct a special cultural policy.

But
over the last five years the situation has changed significantly, because in Moscow there emerged a sense that Lukashenka does not entirely correspond to Russian interests.

Work with pro-Russian groups began.

At present these forces are not very visible, but if the question arises of increasing the Russian presence, they may come to the fore.
— Is there not a third scenario, connected with globalization?

With the decline of the nation as a political community, the destruction or self-destruction of national narratives as a result of deepening international cooperation?
— It is obvious that nation-states have not disappeared anywhere in Europe.

There has been much talk about this, about cultural globalization, the creation of supranational structures, the decline of nations, but this has not happened.

If these processes have not broken the nation-state at the center of globalization, then it is even less likely that this will happen in our region.
— What would you advise doing in the sphere of memory policy and historical policy?
— If we speak about the Belarusian authorities, then their main task should be the preservation of the independence of the Belarusian state.

For this, two things are necessary at the level of historical policy.

First, attention should be paid to information security, because recent events have shown that the mass consciousness of Belarus’s population is very vulnerable to Russian media; this is a significant threat.

Therefore, a set of measures should be thought through to create barriers to Russian manipulation of Belarusian public opinion.

Second, long-term planning in the humanitarian sphere is needed.

Maintaining salaries and pensions is not enough to preserve citizens’ loyalty; one must work at the level of culture, language, and history.

All of this constitutes important mobilizing factors and requires not a situational but a strategic approach.

Long-term planning is needed, but signs of such an approach are not yet visible.

The same project of creating a Belarusian state ideology has turned into routine bureaucratism.

As for civil society, we must do what we have been doing: write books, conduct research, and create alternative educational norms.

It is necessary to stimulate creativity, raise standards, and expand the audience of one’s cultural work.
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The conversation took place on the eve of the conference “Nation during Crisis” (https://palityka.org/2016/04/prahrama-v-mizhnarodnaj-navukovaj-kanfjerencyi-instytuta-palitychnaja-sfjera-nacyja-padchas-kryzisu/) (Minsk, 12—14 May), organized by the Political Sphere Institute.

Interview by Andrei Kazakevich
http://nn.by/?c=ar&i=169984 (http://nn.by/?c=ar&i=169984)