Belarusian Political Scientist: In 2021, the Belarusian Political Model Collapsed

Since August 2020, when the presidential election was held in Belarus, the country has been living through a political crisis.

Political scientist and co-founder of the International Congress of Belarusian Studies Andrei Kazakevich told DW what the collapse of the Belarusian political model means, what awaits the Belarusian opposition, and when change may come.

DW: Summing up the past year, you spoke of “the collapse of the Belarusian political model.”

In February, you returned to this topic again, speaking of “the death of the ideology of the Belarusian state.”

What is the essence of your position?https://www.dw.com/ru/politolog-v-belarusi-proizoshel-raspad-politicheskoj-modeli/a-60783310#
Andrei Kazakevich: The main outcome of 2021 is the collapse of the Belarusian political model as it had been formed since 1996.

A political system must be able to recover after shocks or crises.

But it is already clear that the Belarusian system cannot recover.

Despite its apparent firmness, it turned out to be very fragile: the balance within the ruling elite has been destroyed, and the ideological consensus, a symbiosis of the national, Soviet, and pro-Russian elements, has been destroyed.

The model of foreign policy has also been destroyed: from a donor of stability, Belarus has turned into a real regional threat.

But most importantly, the political consensus has been destroyed, that is, the conventions that allowed people to recognize the legitimacy of the authorities.

In 1994, Lukashenka was indeed elected by a majority, and until 2020 the political consensus consisted in the idea that he was a popular politician (https://www.dw.com/ru/%D1%8F%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B2-%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%87%D1%83%D0%BA-%D1%83-%D0%BB%D1%83%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%88%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BA%D0%BE-%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%BD%D1%83%D1%82-%D1%81%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%8C%D0%B5%D0%B7%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B5-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BC%D1%8B-%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%B6%D0%B5-%D1%81-%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BC-%D1%8D%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%BC-%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%8B%D0%B9-%D0%B5%D0%B3%D0%BE-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B6%D0%B0%D0%BB/a-2306666), who receives a majority in elections.

And the authorities always emphasized that they relied on the majority, but now this understanding of power has been completely destroyed.

The authorities have shifted to a new model that no longer provides for legitimacy received from the people.

As a populist, Alexander Lukashenka always played along with the expectations of the majority, but in 2021 the authorities stopped adjusting to society and began forcing society to adjust to them (https://www.dw.com/ru/ot-ekstremizma-k-nesvobode-kak-vlast-menjaet-nashu-kartinu-mira/a-60398368), hence the repression and the unwillingness to enter into dialogue or compromise.

And legal norms no longer function in the country; law is now the will of the ruling class in its pure form.
– If we speak about the Belarusian political model, it also included such elements as opposition parties, NGOs, and the media.

Can we speak of the collapse of the political model for them as well?
– For them as well.

It seems to me that most of the old parties (https://www.dw.com/ru/kakuju-rol-mogut-sygrat-v-belarusi-oppozicionnye-partii/a-59826422), such as the BPF, the UCP, or the BSDP, have no political future; they will have to reorganize in order to fit into the new model.

Now the so-called “new opposition”, the new names that appeared after the presidential election, absolutely dominates.

We can see personnel flowing from the old opposition into the new one.

If we speak about the model before 2020, opposition political parties were to some extent restricted in their activities, but there was a niche in which they could act quite freely, hold congresses and even electoral campaigns or primaries.

The opposition was recognized (by the authorities, Ed.), but there was such a term as the “opposition ghetto”: 20-25% of the electorate, and one could not go beyond those limits.

The same was true of the media market (https://www.dw.com/ru/%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B9-%D1%87%D1%82%D0%BE-%D0%B1%D1%83%D0%B4%D1%83%D1%82-%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B8%D1%82%D1%8C-%D0%BC%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%81%D0%BA-%D0%B8-%D0%BC%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B2%D0%B0-%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B7%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%85-%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B9-%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B9%D0%BD%D1%8B/a-5817283).

In the late 1990s and in the 2000s, most of the audience was under the influence of state television or newspapers, and there was a separate “ghetto” of independent media.

Around the mid-2010s, a break occurred, when everything changed to the exact opposite.

The best example here is the internet outlet Tut.by (https://www.dw.com/ru/vlasti-belarusi-lishajut-tutby-statusa-smi-chto-jeto-znachit/a-55102622), which became effectively dominant.

The authorities have already destroyed this model as well, which has led to a loss of informational sovereignty: Belarusian media have been forced to leave, and against this background the importance of Russian media has grown.

The television channel Dozhd, vDud, and Echo of Moscow, from purely Russian brands, have already become sources of information for Belarusians as well.
– The European Union and the United States have imposed sanctions against the Belarusian regime, but the authorities are reporting economic growth (https://www.dw.com/ru/rost-est-no-vremennyj-chto-proishodit-s-belorusskoj-jekonomikoj/a-60240809) last year.

Does that mean the collapsed model has turned out to be sufficiently resilient?https://www.youtube.com/embed/I_hcfphI6w8?wmode=transparent
– How resilient the system is (https://www.dw.com/ru/kak-demografia-i-politjemigracia-dobivajut-belorusskuju-ekonomik/a-60509070) will become clear only when it reaches stabilization.

Now it is in a state of transition, in a state of revolutionary change.

Now we can see an attempt to create some kind of new model; we see how everything is changing in ideology, politics, and the information space.

Therefore, we cannot say that the system is stable or that some rules have appeared.

Yes, the economy had a fairly good year, but we do not know what 2022 will be like, and even Lukashenka does not know what will ultimately come of it.
– DW columnist Ivan Preobrazhensky recently compared Belarus with Kadyrov’s Chechnya (https://www.dw.com/ru/kommentarij-sojuznaja-ulovka-22-ili-lukashenko-novyj-pehotinec-putina/a-60712413): with Moscow’s blessing, a usurper may change the constitution and persecute his citizens, but this is no longer sovereignty.

Could this be the new Belarusian model?
– This can be considered as one of the scenarios.

But it is premature to speak about it for now.

In 2021, Russia provided Lukashenka more with political assistance (https://www.dw.com/ru/vo-skolko-rossii-obhoditsja-podderzhka-belarusi/a-58570040) than with economic assistance.

Yes, at the present moment he has become very dependent on Russia, but it is not a fact that this will continue to determine Belarus’s development.

In reality, Lukashenka himself does not benefit from this.

If opportunities open up to escape such vassal dependence, he will escape.
– Given the collapse of the political model, do Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and the democratic forces’ headquarters have a chance to seize the initiative, or should they wait for the 2025 presidential election?
– Alternative political forces do not have many mechanisms to influence the political situation.

There is no possibility to conduct organizational work inside the country, and there is no normal political activity.

I think their main strategy will be to use any opportunities that open up.

Everyone understands that waiting until 2025 is pointless.

Therefore, everything will depend on the economic and foreign-policy situation, on the situation in Russia, on internal dissatisfaction due to the lack of prospects for the majority of the population, and on dissatisfaction among part of the ruling elite. All these opportunities may lead to political change.

Source (https://www.dw.com/ru/politolog-v-belarusi-proizoshel-raspad-politicheskoj-modeli/a-60783310)